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Fear and the Media: A First Amendment

Horror Show
Donald E. Lively*
Since its adoption in 1789, the language of the first amendment has not changed.' The press whose freedom it protects,
however, has changed radically. The printed word, which constituted the press in 1789,2 is today but one element of a media
assemblage that looks to the free press clause for security in
disseminating information. The press, originally a vehicle for
political intercourse, now communicates both visual and aural
3
messages affording a more extensive menu of information.
Freedom of the press, in turn, has evolved into a concept
that varies with the nature of the medium. 4 Although modern
media, such as motion pictures, radio, television, and cable television, did not exist at the time of the Constitution's framing,
they are considered part of the press and have received first
amendment recognition.5 Because of "peculiar characteristics"
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law.
1. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
2. When the first amendment was drafted, the press consisted largely of
partisan publications engaged in political debate. Newspapers had not yet
even emerged as important vehicles for advertising goods and services. At the
time, they carried only a smattering of small, almost inconspicuous advertisements. E. EMERY, THE PRESS AND AMERIcA 68-69 (1962).

3. The mass media's role in disseminating commercial and other forms of
nonpolitical information has been constitutionally recognized. C$, eg.,
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (citing decisions protecting dissemination of truthful commercial speech); Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384-85
(1973) (citing cases and noting that speech is not rendered commercial, losing
first amendment protection, merely because contained in advertising).
4. The guiding principle of such constitutional relativity is that "[e]ach
[medium] tends to present its own peculiar problems." Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
5. See, ag., id. at 502 (granting motion pictures limited first amendment
protection); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226
(1943) (commenting that first amendment recognition has been conferred
upon broadcasting but with the qualification from the outset that "it is subject
to governmental regulation").

6. See National Ass'n of Indep. Television Producers & Distribs. v. FCC,
516 F.2d 526, 531 (2d Cir. 1975); Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d
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attributed to them, however, the constitutional protection af7
forded them is more limited than the print media's.
Beginning with the appearance of motion pictures8 more
than half a century ago, and continuing with the emergence of
electronic media, 9 fear of a new medium's potential for evil' °
470, 477 (2d Cir. 1971). For a detailed and critical evaluation of the nature of
that regulatory approach, see Goldberg & Couzens, "PeculiarCharacteristics"
An Analysis of the FirstAmendment Implications of Broadcasting, 31 FED.
COM. L.J. 1, 25-38 (1978) (discussing rationales for regulating broadcast content, including scarcity of airwaves, the public forum doctrine, and captive audience concerns).
7. For example, government regulation of certain editorial functions is
countenanced with respect to radio and television but not newspapers. Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969) (upholding
constitutionality of the "fairness doctrine" as applied to broadcasters and noting that the scarcity of spectrum space allows the government to regulate the
content of broadcast editorials) with Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (striking down state statute requiring newspapers to
give political candidates equal space to reply to editorial attacks).
Although the variable standards of first amendment safeguards have been
criticized, see Goldberg & Couzens, supra note 6, it has also been argued that a
system that regulates newer media forms, such as radio and television, and
more fully protects the print media actually maximizes first amendment values. See Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the Pressand Public Access: Toward a Theory of PartialRegulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1, 26-37 (1976)
(explaining, inter alia, that access regulation equalizes opportunities for speakers to command an audience, spread diverse points of view, and mobilize public opinion). Such a rationalization loses much of its appeal, however, on
recognition that the newer and less protected media have become dominant.
8. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915) (excluding motion pictures from the first amendment's protections because of
their "capab[ility] for evil"), overruled by Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495 (1952).
9. See Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62
F.2d 850, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1932) (noting that broadcasting could be used to "obstruct the administration of justice, offend the religious susceptibilities of
thousands, inspire political distrust and civic discord, or offend youth and innocence by the free use of words suggestive of sexual immorality."), cert. denied,
288 U.S. 599 (1933). This rationale survives as a continuing regulatory basis, at
least for purposes of excluding "use of words suggestive of sexual immorality"
or those that might "offend youth." See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
748-50 (1978).
Justice Frankfurter, who authored the seminal opinion on the scarcity rationale for broadcast regulation in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 190 (1943), also echoed the concerns expressed in the Trinity decision.
See infra note 10. He expressed fear "that broadcasting is capable of increasing perhaps the most serious of all dangers which threaten democracy and free
institutions today-the danger of passivity-of acceptance by masses of orders
given to them and of things said to them." Radio Corp. of Am. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 412, 426 n.* (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Report of Broadcasting Committee, 1949).
10. See Radio Corp. of Am. v. United States, 341 U.S. 412, 425-26 (1951)
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has been a consistent rationale for either denying new media
first amendment recognition or circumscribing their first
amendment freedom. Although notions that film is mere
"spectacle""1 or that the broadcasting spectrum is a scarce resource' 2 have been articulated as regulatory rationales, government control remains largely a product of the fear that the
media are "fraught with possibilities for service of good or
evil."' 3 To the extent that such social anxiety and suspicion
create a scheme of constitutional relativity for the newer media, the traditional first amendment notions offering societal security through multiplicity of expression are replaced by those
offering comfort through a process more akin to authoritarian
selection. Constitutional history, as discussed below, is fraught
with episodes of danger created and damage caused by similar
shifts in orientation.
The first amendment brooks few grounds for abridging
freedom of the print media. 14 Content diversity in print is regarded, at least by the judiciary, as both essential to and a barometer of society's health.' 5 Diversity in the electronic forum,
however, is viewed as somehow a threat to the health of society, and it therefore arouses fear and distrust.'8 Different char(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the possibilities that "BWudgment
may be confused," that "feeling may be agitated," and that "reason" may be
"deflected" are sufficient grounds for distinction between broadcasting and
writing or speaking) (emphasis added). Justice Fxankfurter's articulation of
concern reflects a common perception that the electronic media possess some
unidentified, but nevertheless unique, capacity to shape opinion in ways unrelated to the merits of the arguments presented.
11. See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915),
overruled by Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
12. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-90 (1969); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943).
13. See National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1202 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (quoting the legislative history of the Radio Act of 1927, 67 Cong.
Rec. 5557, 5558 (1926) (statement of Rep. Johnson)). The court observed that
direct broadcast satellite systems, with the power to reach into every home in
the United States, have "a potential impact on Americans far in excess of the
limited radio services that prompted passage of the Radio and Communications Act." 740 F.2d at 1202.
14. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)
(noting that government regulation of newspaper's editorial control and judgment is inconsistent with first amendment free press guarantees); cqf Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (observing that a newspaper may be subjected to prior restraint, the most invasive form of suppression, only in exceptional cases).
15. See, ag., United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1943), affci, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
16. Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978) (allowing FCC
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acteristics of different media have created for "[e]ach method of
communicating ...

a 'law unto itself,'" reflecting the " 'differ-

17
ing natures, values, abuses and dangers' of each method.'
Fear and anxiety over potential media influence are reflected in the wide array of regulations that govern nonprint
media but are constitutionally inapplicable to the print media.' 8
Such controls and their philosophical underpinnings are antithetical to the "marketplace of ideas"' 9 and the risk-taking
principles 20 of the first amendment. Because of the expansion
of newer and more strictly regulated electronic media, 2 1 absolute protection of only the print media has yielded an increasingly narrower ambit of press freedom overall.
The purpose of this Article is to trace the origins of the distrust, suspicion, and fear of the newer media; to demonstrate
how fear of potential but poorly defined evil is a dominant
force in shaping the perimeters of freedom of the press; and to
consider opportunities for rejecting fear-based impulses in favor
of sentiments more consistent with the purpose of the first
amendment.

I. THE EMERGENCE OF NEW MEDIA AND
CONTRACTION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The emergence of the twentieth century media was neither
regulation of indecency in broadcasting because radio invades the privacy of

people's homes and because indecent broadcasts may reach and harm youthful
or purportedly captive audiences).
17. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)); see FCC
v. League of Women Voters, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 3114 (1984) (quoting Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969)).
18. Licensing systems for motion picture exhibition are an obvious example of abridgment that would be intolerable if applied to the print media. See
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 53-54 (1965). A double standard for offensive language was manifested by the Supreme Court's decision that a satirical
review of "dirty words" was inappropriate for daytime radio but could be properly reprinted in the appendix to the Court's opinion. See FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 751-55 app. (1978).
19. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (espousing a "free trade in ideas"). See generally M. FRANKLIN,
MASS MEDIA LAw 14-20 (2d ed. 1982) (discussing the development and acceptance of the marketplace-of-ideas theory).
20. The first amendment traditionally requires society to take many risks
in allowing free speech. For instance, speech that urges violence may be suppressed only upon an actual showing that it is designed to produce a real and
imminent lawless action and that it is likely to succeed. See Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
21. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
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foreseen nor foreseeable by the framers of the Constitution. It
thus is speculative to consider whether movies, radio, television,
and cable, had they existed in 1789, would have been afforded
the full panoply of first amendment rights given the print media. Perhaps concerns over the scarcity of broadcasting frequencies, the pervasiveness of radio and television, the threats
to individual privacy, the effect of the media on children, or
even the framers' own visceral fears of possible harm would
have resulted in limited constitutional protection for nonprint
media 22 On the other hand, the framers might have shunned
differentiation among media and opted for the same broad language that characterizes the first amendment. Whatever course
the framers would have chosen, the direction in which the law
has evolved is clear, albeit not openly articulated. First amendment analysis is rooted in the notion that newer media have
improper or indecent tendencies or powers of persuasion that
the original press lacked.23
If the print media's technological capabilities had been
more developed at the time of the Constitution's drafting,
newspapers and magazines might well have confronted the reactive attitudes that greet the emergence of new media today.
Indeed, in the late nineteenth century, when the print media
developed the capability to reproduce photographs and thus to
appeal to the eye in a dramatic fashion, such attitudes toward
print began to surface. Multisensory communication drastically
altered the public's perception of the print media, and newspapers and magazines came to be regarded as tools of intrusion,
impropriety, and indecency.2 Concern over those possibilities
22. It has been suggested that "[h]ad James Madison met Chuck Barris,
he might have changed his whole concept of the Bill of Rights"-not only with
respect to the first but also the eighth Amendment. Robinson, Cable Television and the FirstAmendment 6 Com. & L. 47, 48 (1984).

23. The advent of radio, for instance, aroused fear that, among its limitless
possibilities for evil, the medium could "mold and crystalize sentiment as no
agency in the past has been able to do." 67 Cong. Rec. 5557, 5558 (1926) (statement of Rep. Johnson). Similar anxieties have been occasioned by the emer-

gence of motion pictures, television, and direct broadcast satellite systems.
See e.g., Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1975)
(motion pictures), overruled by Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495

(1952); Radio Corp. of Am. v. United States, 341 U.S. 412, 425 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dubitante) (television); National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740

F.2d 1190, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (direct broadcast cable systems).
24. See Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L REV. 193,
195 (1890) ("Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have in-

vaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that 'What is whispered in
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may have arisen too late to alter the constitutional guarantees
for the print media, but they colored the context in which later
media would emerge and be governed. By the late nineteenth
century, social currents, which a hundred years earlier sought
security through a free press, were shifting toward excuses and
formulas for press control that would guard against the media's
new discomforting tendencies.
Since early in the twentieth century, an undifferentiated
phobia of a potential for some evil, rather than a palpable fear
of demonstrable social harm, has been the initial response to
the emergence of each major new medium. Anxiety has been
consistently translated into an identification of certain "peculiar characteristics,"5 which purportedly offer a principled
ground for exclusion of the medium from the full sweep of the
first amendment. 26 These characteristics, the central bases for
regulation, 27 have created troublesome first amendment reasoning and results and have left the newer media subject to signifi28
cant regulation.
the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.' "); F. FRIENDLY, THE MIN108 (1981).
25. National Ass'n of Indep. Television Producers & Distrib. v. FCC, 516
F.2d 526, 531.
26. See Goldberg & Couzens, supra note 6, at 25-38.
27. At times, the regulatory impulse has been aided by other media,
whose interests in first amendment gains, potentially shared with the new medium, have been outweighed by economic concerns and competitive fears.
During the 1960's and 1970's, for instance, broadcasters strongly supported the
Federal Communications Commission's imposition of special programming restrictions on cablecasters that burdened the growth of the cable industry and
its promise of diversity. Such an alliance of broadcasters and regulators
sought, in part, to protect radio and television from competition. See, e.g.,
Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 28 (D.C. Cir.) (recognizing that the
purpose of FCC regulation was to prevent pay-television competition with conventional television), cert denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977), after remand, 587 F.2d
1248 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Most such restrictions eventually were struck down by
the courts or repealed by the FCC. See Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 28.
Other limitations were vacated in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689,
708-09 (1979).
28. Films, for instance, are subject to regulation by censorship boards, if
certain procedural safeguards are provided. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51, 58 (1965). Radio and television are subject to regulation based upon
the "public convenience, interest or necessity." Federal Communications Act
of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), 309(a) (1982). As many commentators have
agreed, "'[p]ublic interest, convenience or necessity' means about as little as
any phrase that the drafters of the Act could have used." Caldwell, The Stan.
dard of Public Interest, Convenience or Necessity as Used in the Radio Act of
1927, 1 AIR L. REV. 295, 296 (1930). Such breadth and vagueness aid the translation of social anxieties and concerns about the media into policies designed
to comfort those fears.
NESOTA RAG
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The recurrent sequence-in which a new medium emerges,
generalized fear of its potential for evil is aroused, analysis that
differentiates it from the print media is established, and rationales evolve for crafting some device for governmental control
of it-first appeared in response to the advent of motion pictures. Judicial recognition that film was even an element of
the press was delayed until long after the medium became popular.29 For nearly forty years after the Supreme Court's decision in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio,30
denying first amendment status to motion pictures, 3 ' movies
were considered apart from rather than a part of the press.
During those forty years, film emerged not only as a vehicle of
entertainment but also as an important information source.32
The distinction used to justify different treatment of motion pictures and "the press" in Mutual Film rested on a finding that motion pictures represented "a business pure and
simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded ... as
part of the press of the country." 33 Motion pictures thus were
denied the recognition necessary for even minimal first amendment protection. Government had a free hand to assuage society's fear and anxiety without regard to first amendment
principles, and it actively did so with regulation designed "to
patrol the highways of the mind."34 Denying the first amendment status of the medium devalued all categories of protected
expression that could be communicated by film. A Memphis,
Tennessee, censorship board, for instance, used its authority to
ban a motion picture "as the south does not permit negroes in
white school nor recognize social equality between the races
even in children."
In trying to distinguish movies from the press, the
29. Although a nineteenth century creation, movies did not receive their
initial first amendment test until the twentieth century.
30. See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S 230 (1915), overruled by Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
31. Mutual Film, 236 U.S. at 244.
32. As the Court later acknowledged: "It cannot be doubted that motion
pictures are a significant medium for the communication of ideas." Joseph
Bursty, 343 U.S. at 501.
33. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915).
34. RD-DR Corp. v. Smith, 89 F. Supp. 596, 598 (N.D. Ga. 1950) (noting
that, absent first amendment protection, such regulatory power was
unchecked).
35. United Artists Corp. v. Board of Censors, 189 Tenn. 397. 401, 225

S.W.2d 550, 551-52 (1949).
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Supreme Court noted that movies offered a "mere representation of events, of ideas and sentiments published and known." 36
Such a distinction was misplaced on its face, because many publications, even then, merely represented events, ideas, and sentiments previously published and known. 37 Such publications,
however, have never been bedeviled by any doubt regarding
their first amendment status. The Court's concern with motion
pictures thus may have been less a matter of function than
effect.

3

The Mutual Film decision, despite the infirmity of its reasoning, nonetheless articulated a concern that has proved to be
enduring. The Court focused on motion pictures' "capability
and power" for evil.3 9 Although the Court "conced[ed] the
40
praise[s]" of motion pictures offered by film distributors, it
concluded that the potential for evil was greater in motion pictures than in print "because of [film's] attractiveness and manner of exhibition. '41 The Court thus established a link between
the evil and the method of disseminating the information. It
did so not upon proof of actual harm but in a style suggesting
that the associated evil could be presumed from common wisdom. The perceived connection and vague underlying assumption would become critical in justifying regulation of all new
media, 42 even though general first amendment principles reject
36. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915),
overruled by Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
37. The Reader's Digest genre of publications provides examples of these.
38. Cf.Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 60-61 (1976)
(allowing zoning restrictions on "adult" theatres despite first amendment coverage of films).
39. Mutual Film, 236 U.S. at 244.
40. Id.at 241. In seeking first amendment recognition, film distributors
maintained that movies "play[ed] an increasingly important part in the spreading of knowledge and the molding of public opinion upon every kind of political, educational, religious, economic and social question." Id. at 237.
Moreover, they alluded to film's capacity for "graphic expressions of opinion
and sentiments, as exponents of policies, as teachers of science and history, as
useful, interesting, amusing, educational and moral." Id.at 241. The Court acknowledged those virtues but noted that the medium "may be used for evil"
and declined to extend it first amendment protection. Id. at 242.
41. Id. at 244. The Court, in effect, had acknowledged that film had the
capacity to inform and educate and that it thus shared the attributes of the
traditional press. Id.at 241-42. The Court's refusal to confer first amendment
protection upon motion pictures thus evinces a fairly forthright acknowledgment that a medium, having structural and functional attributes of the press,
was being dismissed as an element of the press because of the fear and anxiety
it aroused.
42. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) ("[e]ach
[medium] tends to present its own peculiar problems"); see also Columbia
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equating evil with enhanced attractiveness or influence. 43
The Mutual Film decision was overturned in the 1950's,
but the "capacity for evil" theme that it embraced survived. In
Joseph Burstyn4 Inc. v. Wilson,4" the Court rejected its Mutual
Film holding and conceded that "expression by means of motion pictures is included within the ...
guaranty of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments." 45 The Court nonetheless retained the medium-specific analysis that characterized the Mutual Film decision. Although Joseph Burstyn was generally
46
hailed as a major first amendment victory for new media, it
actually constitutionalized their "second-class citizenship" and
enshrined media fear as a basis for regulation. Under the guise
of expanding the first amendment's ambit, the Court affirmed a
scheme of constitutional relativity. Thus, even if "potential for
evil" was no longer a basis for total first amendment deprivation, it remained a predicate for content regulation. 47
The consequent accommodation, affording first amendment
recognition at the price of regulation, has served as the model
for limiting the freedom of all other nonprint media. 48 Using
that analysis, the Court first observes that first amendment recognition "is not the end of [the] problem." 49 It then concludes
Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127-28 (1973) (holding that "captive" nature of broadcast audience justifies increased regulation);

Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (arguing that subliminal impact of broadcast media may have greater impact than the written
word), cert denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
43. See First Natl Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 (1978); Times Film
Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 77 (1961) (Warren, C.J., dissenting);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945).
44. The Court actually had telegraphed its rejection of the Mutual Film
holding a few years before Joseph Burstyn. A preview of the change came in

United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948), in which
the Court observed: "We have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers

and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First
Amendment"
45. 343 U.S. at 502.
46. The Supreme Cour4 1951 Term, 66 HARV. L. REv. 99. 115 (1952); 32

B.U.L.
(1953);
N.Y.U.
47.
48.

REV. 451,452-53 (1952); 41 GEO. L.J. 94, 94-96 (1952); 41 KY. L.J. 257, 258
37 Mn N. I REV. 209, 209-10 (1953); 31 N.CJ.. REv. 103, 115 (1952); 27
L. REV. 699, 702 (1952).
See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747-49 (1978).
See Joseph Burshyn, 343 U.S. at 502-03. A preview of the theory was

suggested in an earlier concurring opinion by Justice Jackson, which commented that each medium had characteristics warranting unique formulations

of governance. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
49. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952); see also
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 498, 501 (1981) (adapting analy-
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that a new medium is not subject to the same rules governing
other forms of expression because "each tends to present its
own peculiar problems." 50 Investment in such distinctions permits the Court to uphold types of regulation that would be un51
constitutional if imposed on the print media.
The overruling of Mutual Film's fear-based holding has, in
the long run, been meaningless to the extent that the affirmation of media-specific first amendment analysis has ensured the
vitality of fear-based regulatory rationales. Concerns virtually
identical to those expressed in Mutual Film have been sounded
with the emergence of radio, television, and cable television and
have become the policy foundations for each new medium's
governance. 52 For each medium, the Court has qualified constitutional protection by focusing on purported differences between the natures of the new, mostly electronic and old print
media. 53 A mechanism for maintaining some measure of control over new media thus has been maintained. Although the
device may operate less heavy handedly than Mutual Film's
complete denial of first amendment protection, it is equally
effective.
II.

FEAR-BASED REGULATION OF THE ELECTRONIC
MEDIA
The Mutual Film Court's concern with film's potential for

sis to billboards); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744-46 (1978) (adapting
analysis to broadcasting); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386
(1969) (same); Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F.
Supp. 976, 980 (D.R.I. 1983) (adapting analysis to cable television).
50. See Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 503; see also Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748
(reaching same conclusion); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386-87 (same).
51. See, e.g., Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 392; Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace
Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX.L. REv. 207, 218-19 (1982). For example, because of spectrum scarcity and a congressional mandate to the FCC
to regulate radio and television in the public interest, the Court upheld broadcast licensing and fairness schemes that it would not countenance for newspapers. Pacfia,438 U.S. at 748.
52. See National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1203 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); see also Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731 n.2 (quoting FCC's justification for
"special treatment" of broadcasting). The Court in Pacifica also enumerated a
list of anxieties that were the basis for banishing from the air waves programming that may be offensive to segments of the broadcasting audience. They
included fears regarding the "uniquely pervasive presence [of the broadcasting
media] in the lives of all Americans ... [and that] broadcasting is uniquely
accessible to children." Id.at 748-49; see infra notes 86-89 and accompanying
text.
53. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 101 (1973); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389.
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unique influence, rather than with any demonstrable tendency
of film to induce illegal or otherwise regulable conduct, has
been imported and restated in support of regulating the electronic media.5 Like motion pictures, radio and television offered the prospect not only of political discourse but of novelty,
expanded breadth of content, and mass and multisensory appeal. Motion pictures, with their capacity to project movement,
and later sound, had magnified the fear and anxiety first
aroused by the reproduction of still pictures in newspapers and
magazines.ss Radio, and then television, which were "in the
air" and thus perceived as even more intrusive, exacerbated
those fears. Not surprisingly, therefore, first amendment protection for broadcasting, like that for film, was qualified.Y
The limited first amendment protection of the electronic
media has permitted regulation that would be unconstitutional
if applied to the print media. One of the most prominent examples5 7 is the "fairness doctrine," which was endorsed by the
Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC.58 The fairness doctrine imposes on broadcasters a two-part requirement
consisting of an affirmative duty, to present controversial issues
and a consequent responsibility to provide contrasting perspectives.5 9 Although the fairness doctrine has been persistently
and persuasively criticized in recent years,r>° the Supreme Court
has not altered its favorable disposition toward it.6 1 Whatever
the advantages or disadvantages of the fairness doctrine, the
imposition of a similar content regulation on the print media is
54. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
at 127-28; Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 842 (1969).
55. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.

56. See cases cited supra note 5.
57. Other areas in which the FCC has imposed content specific regulations include licensing, see REPORT AND STATEMENT OF POLICY R s COMiibS.
SION en banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2312-16 (1960), and the
broadcasting of "offensive materials," Pacifica 438 U.S. at 735-38. For an analysis and criticism of the FCC's role in content regulation by an incumbent
chairman of the FCC, see Fowler & Brenner, supra note 51.
58. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
59. Id. at 377.
60. See, e.g., Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press
1975 DuKE L.J. 213, 234-37; Fowler & Brenner, supra note 51, at 221-26; Note,
Enforcing the Obligation to Present ControversialIssues: The Forgotten Half
of the Fairness Doctrine, 10 HARV. C.R-C.L .J. REv. 137 (1975); Comment,
Power in the Marketplace of Ideas. The Fairness Doctrine and the First
Amendment, 52 TEY L. REV. 727 (1974).
6L FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3116-18 (1984). But
see infra note 83.
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prohibited by the first amendment. 62
Content regulation such as the fairness doctrine is countenanced by, if not in part a product of, a less stringent standard
of constitutional review for the electronic media than for print
media. Generally, governmental content regulation of the print
media will survive constitutional scrutiny only if it serves a
"compelling governmental interest." 63 The Court, however, has
allowed the FCC considerable latitude to regulate the electronic media in or for the "public convenience, interest, or necessity."6 4 Although the precise standard of review for
regulation of the electronic media has not been clearly delineated, the Court has conceded that, "because broadcast regulation involves unique considerations, our cases have not followed
precisely the same approach that we have applied to other media and have never gone so far as to demand that such regulations serve 'compelling' governmental interests."6 5 To the
extent that new regulatory rationales have been articulated,
therefore, they still have been capable of surviving on a showing of potential rather than demonstrable harm.
At first glance, regulation of the electronic media appears
schizophrenic. For instance, concern over spectrum scarcity
has been used to justify imposing fairness obligations on broadcasters. 66 Fairness regulation purportedly seeks to encourage
67
content diversity and thus promote first amendment values.
62. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). In
Tornillo, a right of reply requirement and fairness standard, similar to that
which survived constitutional scrutiny in Red Lion, was struck down when applied to a newspaper because it invaded the publisher's first amendment
rights. See id. at 247-48.
63. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3115 (1984); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744-48 (1978).
64. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1982).
65. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3115 (1984).
66. Scarcity of spectrum space refers to the fact that, "[u]nlilke other
modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all." National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943). Thus, "there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to
allocate." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969). For a
criticism of the continuing validity of the concerns about spectrum space, see
infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
67. Because of the limited number of radio and television frequencies
available and the presumed constraints upon viewpoint diversity, the Supreme
Court has concluded that balanced programming of controversial issues, as
mandated by fairness regulation, is consistent with first amendment values
and rights, given their "unusual ordering" in the electronic forum. See Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-92 (1969); see also infra note
72.
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Yet such content-enhancement schemes coexist with contentrestrictive ones that evince fear of true diversification. 68
Upon closer examination the contradiction becomes illusory. The ineffectiveness of the fairness doctrine in serving its
stated purpose, along with the willingness of the Supreme
Court to adhere to a rationale hopelessly detached from reality,
suggests that fairness regulation may actually mask a darker
fear and regulatory impulse. Critics have long argued that fairness regulation disserves the interests of diversity, 69 and the
FCC itself recently proposed its repeal. 70 Evidence suggests
that the fairness doctrine actually chills speech by discouraging
broadcasters from presenting controversial programming.7 '
From its inception, the spectrum scarcity rationale used to
distinguish broadcast from print media, and thereby justify fairness regulation, 72 was flawed. Even at the time of Red Lion,
68. See, ag., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-51 (1978).
69. See, ag., Fowler & Brenner, supra note 51, at 713-2L
70. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking In re Repeal or Modification of the
Personal Attack and Political Editorial Rules, 48 Fed. Reg, 28,295, 28.298,
28,301 (1983) (currently codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1920, 73.1930) (June 21,
1983).
71. See Fowler & Brenner, supm note 51, at 229. Although the courts
continue to uphold the fairness doctrine, Justice Brennan has observed that
broadcasters assume "angry customers are not good customers and.., it is
simply 'bad business' to espouse--or even to allow others to espouse-the heterodox or the controversial." Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l

Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 187 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
One obvious cure for remedying broadcaster adversion to controversyenergetic government enforcement of fairness regulation-would be worse
than the malady. Such rigorous enforcement, even in the name of first
amendment values, would invite government abuse and manipulation and
present a profound threat to first amendment guarantees. The FCC is empowered to punish fairness violations by revoking a station's license, 47 U.S.C.
§ 312(a) (1982), issuing a short-term license renewal, see 47 U.S.C. § 307(d)
(1982), levying a fine, 47 U.S.C. § 502 (1982), or issuing a cease and desist order,
47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (1982). Fairness violations also may be an issue when a
broadcaster's license is up for renewal. See, eg., In re Applications of
KSD/KSD-TV, Inc., 61 F.C.C.2d 504 (1976). The availability of enforcement
mechanisms for silencing broadcasters has not gone unnoticed by various presidential administrations that have been offended by programming they regarded as undesirable. See S. SEMWONs, THE FAIRNESs DocrlINE AND THE
MEDIA 219-20 (1978); Bazelon, supra note 60, at 244-5L Although the FCC
generally has resisted abusive enforcement efforts, the mere prospect of protracted and costly challenges to and litigation of a licensing decision represents
an intimidation factor that is by no means inconsequential.
72. Fairness regulation, as discussed earlier, purportedly seeks to insure
that viewpoints are not excluded from the electronic media. The result is an
"unusual order of First Amendment values." Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973). Paramount in the hierarchy
is "the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
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broadcasting outlets were more numerous than daily newspapers. In 1970, a total of 1748 daily newspapers were in existence. 73 The number decreased to only 1744 by the end of the
decade,74 contrasted with 10,239 radio and television stations
operating in 1982. 75 Especially in metropolitan areas, most of
which may be characterized as one or two newspaper towns,
the number of broadcasting76outlets far exceeds the number of
operating daily newspapers.
The Court has used scarcity to justify fairness regulation
only in the electronic forum but has recognized that the problem also exists in the print media. Although it is true that not
everyone who wants to broadcast can do so, 7 7 economic factors
make "entry into the marketplace of ideas served by the print
media almost impossible." 78 Nevertheless, the Court has force79
fully rejected urgings for fairness regulation of newspapers.
The access problems of both media, contrasted with their radimoral, and other ideas and experiences." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
73. Ervin, Media and the FirstAmendment in a Free Society, 60 GEO. L.J.
871, 892 (1972).
74. AYER DIRECTORY OF PUBLICATIONS viii (1979).

75. A total of 9160 radio stations and 1079 television stations were operating in the United States at the end of 1982. ASSOCIATED PRESS BROADCAST
SERV., 1983 BROADCASTING/CABLECASTING YEARBOOK A-2 (1983).

76. For instance, 46 radio stations and 9 television stations were licensed
to operate in New York City during the year of 1982. Id at B-166, C-35. A
medium-sized city, Columbus, Ohio, had 19 radio stations and 5 television stations licensed to operate. Id. at B-187, C-40. Even the smallest television market, Glendive, Montana, had three radio stations and one television station. Id.
at B-146, C-31, C-208.
77. See supra note 66.
78. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 251 (1974).
When the first amendment was adopted, entry into publishing was inexpensive and access to the instrumentalities of the media was relatively free.
COMM'N ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 14
(1947). The emergence of newspaper groups and chains and corporate ownership, however, has reduced such access and minimized competition. See id. at
15-19; Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 249 & n.13.
79. See generally Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 247-58. In addition, antitrust immunity conferred upon publishing combinations enables such enterprises to
achieve economies of scale and advertising rate-to-circulation advantages that
discourage new competition. See generally Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594, 622-28 (1953) (publishing company's refusal to accept advertising unless placed in both of the company's newspapers did not violate Sherman Act). This immunity has been codified in the form of an
antitrust exemption for joint newspaper operating arrangements. See Newspaper Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-353, 84 Stat. 466 (1970) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1801-04 (1982)).
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cally different constitutional protections, evince little logic but
perhaps much sensitivity to popular concerns.
When the Court embraced the premise that spectrum space
was limited, it created a rationale on a collision course with itself. Many agree the collision has already occurred. Technological progress has yielded additional and alternative forms of
"broadcasting" to such an extent that scarcity arguments ring
hollow. 0 Except for the Supreme Court, the fairness doctrine
has few contemporary supporters. The bankruptcy of fairness
rationales thus may reveal more than judicial errancy in accepting them. What may be evinced is a long-standing mindset, traceable to Mutual Film, that the risk of abandoning control premises, no matter how unpersuasive or irreconcilable
with the first amendment, is unacceptable.
If so, the illusory nature of the contradiction between content-restrictive schemes and purportedly content-enhancing
fairness regulation is more easily seen. Because fairness regulation serves its stated objectives ineffectively and from a dubious
predicate, its real value to defenders may be as a means of content control rather than enhancement. Consequently, a common thread tying together all content-oriented broadcasting
regulation may be the notion that some restraining device is
necessary to ensure that the medium does not unduly influence
society's direction or engulf its values.
The lengthy interval between the Mutual Film decision
and its reversal in Joseph Burstyn may also offer insight into
the continuing vitality of fairness regulation. Abandoning an
available regulatory rationale, however deficient, requires the
sacrifice of control pending a replacement. The Court took
many years to develop a theory that would allay the fears underlying the Mutual Film decision but not so nakedly abridge
the first amendment. A reading of the Court's initial decision

on fairness regulation, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,8 ' in
the context of later content-oriented broadcasting decisions sug80. Although cable television is the most obvious new development, many
other substitutes for over-the-air distribution, for both radio and television, are
currently available. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 51, at 225-26. Even the

Court noted an expectation "that the advent of cable television will afford increased opportunities for the discussion of public issues." Columbia Broadcast-

ing Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 131 (1973). The Court is
unwilling to change its approach, however, "Without some signal from Congress or the FCC that technological developments have advanced so far that
some revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be required." FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3116 n.11 (1984).

81. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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gests that the Court may have been responding to the same visceral fears it first expressed in Mutual Film. As it did in
Mutual Film, the Court in Red Lion may have adopted a relatively unsatisfactory rationale in anticipation of eventually lo82
cating more palatable and persuasive reasons for control.
The search in that direction continues to yield concerns
that, reminiscent of the Mutual Film decision, seem to be presumed from common wisdom rather than proved by a showing
of actual harm.8 3 Thus, one court has observed that written
messages require the affirmative act of reading, whereas broadcast messages are "in the air." 4 Implicit in that distinction
seems to be the notion that the public has a self-defense mechanism against offensive materials in the print media but is vulnerable to insidious and subversive transmissions of the
electronic media.85 With that premise as a starting point, the
Court has recognized several peculiar characteristics supporting
82. The Court has hinted that it might reexamine its support of fairness
regulation if Congress or the FCC signals that technology has rendered the
scarcity premise obsolete. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct.
3106, 3116 n.11 (1984). In the same breath, the Court reaffirmed the pertinence of more recently articulated concerns that broadcasting is pervasive, intrusive, and accessible to children. Id. at 3117 n.13 (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at
748-50. The court has thus positioned itself to abandon a demonstrably unsatisfactory rationale in favor of one it finds more persuasive. Although this alternative basis for regulation is more sweeping, because it is concerned with
the perceived general nature and effect of the medium rather than the medium's supposed scarcity, the rationale is even more patently fear-motivated,
evincing discomfort with a medium's capacity for evil. The alternative rationale is thus no more genuinely persuasive or satisfactory than the spectrum
scarcity rationale was, and, to the extent that the alternative has fewer pretenses about distancing itself from the Mutual Film type of reasoning, it may
be a sign of regression.
83. The Court, when confronting constitutional issues with major social
implications, has relied heavily on medical, psychological, or sociological expertise and findings. See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2492 n. 11 (1983); (abortions); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 149 n. 44, 161 n. 62 (1973) (same); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 493-94 & n. 11 (1954) (school segregation). Despite extensive social science
research on the electronic media's effect on children, the Court referred to no
such authority in connection with its articulated concern regarding the accessibility of radio and television to children. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726 (1978).
84. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 (D.C.Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 842 (1969).
85. Courts thus have expressed concern with "the subliminal impact of
this pervasive propaganda [commercials], which may be heard even if not listened to, [and] may reasonably be thought greater than the impact of the written word." Id. at 1100-01.
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"special treatment of indecent broadcasting."as Those factors
include the ready access of unsupervised children to radios;87
the presence of radio receivers in the home, where privacy interests are entitled to extra deference;8s and the possibility that
unconsenting adults may tune in a station without any warning
that offensive language is being or will be broadcast.8 9 None of
those articulated concerns, however, translates into a demonstrable or particularized harm or is supported by empirical evidence of cause and effect. Instead, each concern is traceable to
the breeding ground of social fear and anxiety that spawned the
Mutual Film decision and thus may serve primarily to disguise
mediaphobic regulatory impulses.
Even if distinctions can be made among and rational concerns raised about the various media, the difficulty of uniform
application and the absence of profound differences cautions
against constitutional generalizations. Making distinctions
among media is not a particularly taxing exercise, because each
medium is in fact different in structure, operation, and impact.
If it were useful to identify tenable "peculiar characteristics,"
the actual substantive capabilities of the media would provide
the necessary focal point. Newspapers are better able to capture and communicate the multiple dimensions and nuances of
an issue. Television's substantive content, by contrast, often is
either diminished in favor of visual emphasis necessary for audience appeal or lost altogether because it flashes by too
rapidly.9 0
Given the contemporary constitutional mode of evaluating
newer media, such a difference might support the case for fairness regulation to promote breadth and diversity. Elevating
such a distinguishing characteristic to a level at which it is pivotal for first amendment purposes, however, remains troublesome. Distinctions, even real ones, that are based on "peculiar
characteristics" foster generalization and do not serve well as
springboards for constitutional policymaking. For example,
86. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978).
87. I& at 749-50.
88. 1& at 748 (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970)). By
1984, more than 98% of the nation's homes had at least one television set, and
more than 470 million radio sets were in operation. ASSOCIATED PRESS

BROADCAST SERv., supra note 75, at A-2.
89. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 74849 (1978).
90. Swan, "Buying the Bomb" reveals the gap between print and TV journalisrm, Christian ScL Monitor, Mar. 4, 1985, at 39, col. 1. Walter Cronkite's
frequent lament was that the information squeezed into a half-hour newscast
would fill only one quarter of a page in the New York Times. Id. at 40.

1088

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1071

even if newspapers as a medium are better suited for comprehensive offerings, probably only a few major newspapers actually try to maximize such service. Even then, editorial
discretion favors exhaustive coverage of some issues but not
others. Unevenness within a given media sector, therefore,
tends to diminish the utility of even insightful generalizations
about media characteristics.
Notwithstanding such problems even with sound distinctions, the much less persuasive distinctions discussed earlier are
used to justify disparate standards for broadcasting. "Special
treatment of broadcasting" is a euphemism for regulation. 91
Because broadcasting, like motion pictures, has received first
amendment recognition, 92 the Mutual Film-type concerns alone
are analytically insufficient to support content regulation.
Anxiety, therefore, may be combined with some perceived peculiarity of the medium-such as pervasiveness, intrusiveness,
or accessibility to children-to justify regulation. Consistent
with constitutional analysis of the fairness doctrine, regulation
of what may be defined as offensive programming is countenanced because the Court applies a less stringent standard of
review for regulation of the nonprint than for the print media.93 Less exacting scrutiny affords a more hospitable environment for regulatory rationales that are deficient and
antithetical to first amendment values.
A diminished standard of review also has insulated the judiciary from the necessity of choosing, pursuant to stricter scrutiny, between the embarrassment of being indelibly identified
with flawed regulatory rationales and the discomfort of rejecting all content-specific regulations. For example, the Court
has not had to explain why children must be protected from offensive broadcasting when the same children may have access
to adult-oriented books, magazines, and other printed material
94
or may be exposed to offensive playground epithets or stories.
Instead, it has pursued an exercise in line drawing that yields
91. For example, the Pacifica case itself upheld the right of the government, through the FCC, to punish broadcasters for airing material defined as
"indecent" by Congress and the FCC. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731-32, 738-41.
92. See id at 748; United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131,
166 (1948); see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969)
("broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a First Amendment interest").
93. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
94. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 767-70 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Some parents, in fact, may desire to expose their children to expression that may be offensive to others. See id. at 770 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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more confoundment than constitutional consonance. A recording of an offensive monologue may be freely available in a record store for electronic playback at home. Its electronic
transmission to the home, however, may be punished, even
though the same premises and sound system are implicated.
Equally incongruous and difficult to understand is why the
statement "Fuck the Draft" would be any less objectionable
when it appears on the back of a jacket, on which a curious
child may focus a prolonged gaze, than when it is communicated electronically. Although the former means of expression
may not be prohibited, 95 the latter may.96 Such disparate treatment demonstrates the ease with which facile differentiations
among media and speech forms can aid fear and anxiety in
purging, from the most dominant media, expression traditionally considered at the core of first amendment protection 97
Use of a lesser standard of review has at least allowed the
Court to escape the problem. 98
The Court has also been able to avoid the issue of whether
the special privacy interest conferred upon the home" cuts
moredeeply against regulation than for it. For example, just as
an indecent or offensive guest can be ordered to leave the
home, so too can a television or radio, without special regulation, be switched to a more desirable program.' °0 The privacy
95. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22-23 (1971).
96. The statement at issue in Cohen was political and thus fell within a
category of speech that the Court has been most inclined to protect. See
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); cf. A. MEOcLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT, 18-19, 22-27 (1948) (arguing
that the first amendment "is not the guardian of unregulated talkativeness," it
is the protector of the community thinking process).
97. See, eg., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d
1370, 1379 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982).
98. For a related discussion concerning special regulations of the broadcast media in the interest of children, not because of offensiveness but because
of children's susceptibility to advertising, see Pauker, The Case ForFT Regulation of Television Advertising Directed Toward Children, 46 BROOKLYN IREv. 513 (1980).
99. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969).
100. See Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon,
C.J., concurring), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); cf. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (holding that government may selectively shield
the public from offensive speech only when "the degree of captivity makes it
impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure").
When expression intrudes upon the privacy of the home, government regulation generally has been countenanced. See eg., Rowan v. Post Office Dep't,
397 U.S. 728, 737-38 (1970). Reliance on such authority is misplaced, or at least
unpersuasive, when the offended person has the means and authority effectively to silence the source of offensiveness.
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interest of the home, and the very notion of privacy in the
sense of autonomy, 1 1 are more affronted by government regulation, which dictates what the occupants can and cannot see
and hear, than by the absence of regulation, which preserves
their autonomy to make such decisions themselves. 102
In upholding content specific regulations, the courts generally make the obligatory "importance of the first amendment"
recitations and then focus on the effect of the offensive broadcast on the unconsenting viewer or listener. 10 3 Left unexplained is why the interests of those unconsenting persons
require depriving others in the audience of what those others
want to see or hear. Consent to the risk of being offended can
be presumed from a person's decision to place a radio or television in his or her home. 104 Further, assuming that thin-skinned
viewers and listeners can obtain knowledge of available programming, they can adequately guard against offensive programming simply by refusing to watch or listen to it.10 5 Even if
caught off-guard, the viewer or listener is able to silence the offensive material.
It is doubtful that any programming could be so offensive
that a fleeting glimpse or overheard sound would justify depriving an entire audience of an expression that, if disseminated by
another medium, would be constitutionally protected. Ordinarily, if privacy considerations have been found to justify protection against unwanted exposure to offensive expression, the
101. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1973).
102. In Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969), the Supreme Court
recognized a person's "right to read or observe what he pleases-the right to
satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home."
103. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744-51 (1978).
104. Although some may argue that radio and television have become necessities, see supra note 88, and therefore any consent is illusory, such an argument seems premised on an overbroad definition of necessity. More
importantly, such an argument ignores an individual's motives-most people
purchase radios and televisions because they enjoy listening to or watching
them, not because of a felt necessity.
105: See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 765-66 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 556 F.2d 9, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon,
C.J., concurring), rev'd 438 U.S. 726 (1978). It is simply unrealistic to assume
that abandoning content-specific regulations would cause a flood of offensive
material to be broadcast. As Justice Brennan has observed, "angry customers
are not good customers." Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 187 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. FCC v. WNCN
Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 593-99 (1981) (FCC's policy of granting radio
broadcast licenses without a hearing to consider programming format changes
is constitutionally permissible; FCC may rely on market forces to promote
diversity).

1985]

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

individual has still been responsible for initiating the insulating
procedure.l °6 Given viewers' and listeners' inherent autonomy
and control over broadcast reception, the burden on them of assuming responsibility for exposure to offensive material seems
far less than the burden imposed on first amendment concerns
by prohibiting or curtailing the expression.
II.

NEW MEDIA AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO
REAPPRAISE OLD FEARS

Cable television, as one of the newer major media, is in the
initial stage of having its first amendment status defined.
Given the early point in the medium's constitutional evolution,
a convenient opportunity exists for reexamining the bases of
new media regulation. The emergence of cable television
presents at least two issues that reveal further the inadequacies
of established media-specific analysis. The first is whether and
how differences between cable and other media are constitutionally significant. The second is whether the appropriate
standard for determining permissible expression, in a medium
characterized by channel multiplicity and thus catering to specialized audiences, is the tastes of a general or a particular
audience.
The nature of cable television enhances doubt about the validity of articulated distinctions between broadcast and print
media. Cable is essentially a hybrid medium, capable of delivering a daily newspaper or transmitting programming offered
by broadcasters. It thus could make academic, both practically
and philosophically, the question of whether the print and electronic media should be subject to variable regulation.'07 An assessment of cable might be most profitable if regarded as an
opportunity for reexamining fear-based regulatory rationales
and reconsidering whether "peculiar characteristics" justify disparate first amendment treatment or simply ensure constitutional mischief.
Despite evidence that cable and other media are more alike
106. See Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 735-38 (1970) (householder may direct postal service to order disseminator of offensive material
not to mail it to him).

107. It may be argued that reading an electronic newspaper requires the
same engagement of the mind that reading a regular newspaper does and thus
invites active participation rather than mere passive reception by the viewer.

Such a behavioral focus, however, is unlikely to yield principles for differentiation that are compatible with a general proscription against abridging freedom
of the press.
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than different, however, the courts persist in searching for differences and trying to determine whether cable is more like
newspapers or more like radio and television. 108 The pursuit of
classification forces courts into the precarious, if not apostate,
exercise of calibrating a medium's first amendment protection
according to its "peculiar characteristics." However courts
eventually classify cable, the choice would seem to increase
pressure for reevaluation of those media that cable is found to
be less "like."
If cable were afforded press liberties comparable to those
of the print media, denying such freedom to broadcasters would
seem more difficult. At least to the extent that broadcasters'
programming is the same as that offered by cable operators, the
imposition of content restrictions on one but not the other
would seem anomalous. Regulation of cable by a scheme similar to that which presently governs broadcasting, however,
might endanger the broader freedoms traditionally enjoyed by
the print media. Subjecting the electronic but not the printed
edition of a daily newspaper to content regulation, even though
both contained offensive material or did not comport with fairness notions, would be inconsistent. 09
The vexation such a dilemma fosters for the logic of mediaspecific analysis is evinced by the conclusions of courts that
have diligently sought "peculiar characteristics" to differentiate
cablecasting from other media. 110 By its nature, cable clearly
cannot be saddled with the scarcity rationale associated with
broadcasting. Similarly, arguments that cable is a natural mo108. See, e.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d
1370, 1376-80 (10th Cir. 1981), cert dismissed 456 U.S. 1001 (1982); Midwest
Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1054-57 (8th Cir. 1978), czffd, 440 U.S. 689
(1979); Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976,
984-86 (D.R.I. 1983).
109. Regulating electronic editions of newspapers in the same manner as
broadcasting might also resuscitate the now-lifeless argument that the printed
version should be similarly governed. See, e.g., Barron, Access to the Press-A
New FirstAmendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1656-60 (1967). This argument was rejected in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
247-58 (1974) (citing Barron).
110. See, e.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d
1370, 1377-79 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982); Berkshire
Cablevision of Rhode Island v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 980-87 (D.R.I. 1983).
The Supreme Court has concluded that cable television should not be regulated as a common carrier but otherwise has largely avoided an exploration
and explication of the first amendment rights of cable operators. See FCC v.
Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 708, 709 n.19 (1979).
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nopolym- do not offer a principled basis for distinguishing it
from the economic monopoly present in a one-newspaper
city.=

Recognizing that any scarcity in cable results from

franchising and natural monopoly rather than spectrum
shortage, several courts have concluded that such a result
"solely of economic conditions is apparently insufficient to justify even limited government intrusion into the first amendment rights of the conventional press."'' 3 Despite cable's
electronic nature, therefore, some courts have been inclined to
regard a cablecaster's first amendment rights as more akin to a
publisher's than a broadcaster's. n 4
Efforts to divine whether cable is more like newspapers
than radio or television ultimately must confront a lurking paradox fostered by fear-based media regulation. Having been
compelled to seek differences that necessitate special forms of
regulation, courts must consider whether cable's unique capacity for diversity diminishes its first amendment standing. Unlike broadcasters, cablecasters do not profit from programming
that appeals to the least common denominator and therefore
need not select programming that tends to minimize offensiveness.m Instead, cable operators must appeal to many discrete
audiences with diverse programming tastes. The formula for
cable success thus ensures, and has delivered, programming
that appeals to certain audiences and offends others. Because
multiplicity of expression is mandated by cable's profit strategy
and facilitated by its nature, a confrontation between first
amendment values and the anxiety that diversity arouses seems
unavoidable.
The emergence of cable television thus offers a challenge
to the fear-based "recognition but regulation" legacy of Joseph
Burstyn- 6 and an opportunity to develop a new constitutional
theory consistent with the language and spirit of the first
amendment. One possible starting point for rethinking and retooling constitutional perspectives is recognition that the absence of today's dominant media at the time of the
Constitution's drafting does not justify affording them less pro111. See Community CommunicationsCo., 660 F.2d at 1379.
112. See supranotes 73-79 and accompanying text.
113. See, ag., Mlidwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1055 (8th Cir.
1978), aff'd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (quoting Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 657
F2d 9,46 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977)).

114. See, eg., Midwest Video Corp., 571 F.2d at 1055.
115. See supranote 105.

116. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
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tection.11 7 The architects of the first amendment were not confronted with such diverse media as movies, television, radio,
and cable when they articulated the principle of freedom of the
press. Still, an extensive variety of media existed at the time of
the first amendment's drafting. Newspapers, pamphlets, posters, and leaflets, for instance, possessed different characteristics, resulted from divergent values, invited different abuses,
and presented various dangers."" 5 Each, therefore, had its own
capacity for evil.11 9 Even given such potential, however, the
first amendment was drafted in generic rather than differentiated terms. Whether the Constitution is read as a rigid or adaptive instrument, a compulsive reliance on differences among
media as a basis for disparate protection of content seems at
best an improper and at worst dangerous posture.
Setting principled perimeters of press freedom thus requires abandoning the perspective that each medium is a separate forum and problem. Instead of straining for differences
among media, it is simpler and more perceptive to acknowledge
that information is disseminated from a variety of sources in
the media marketplace and that every medium may be influential in shaping public thought. Each medium competes and interacts with other media and the influence of any one normally
is balanced by the presence of others. 20 Focusing on the me117. If regulation is acceptable merely because a medium has "no tradition
of nearly absolute freedom from government control," Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1379 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982), the regulatory impulses triggered by the social
friction and distrust that a new medium arouses are even more easily sustained. Such an undemanding standard affords constitutional refuge to the
persistent strain of social philosophy that asserts as its central premise that individuals should not be allowed to publicly express certain ideas or thoughts.
By trading autonomous for paternalistic decisionmaking, such governance subjects specialized expression, intended for and appreciated by a discrete target
audience, to the general audience's standards of acceptability, see FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 766 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting), which, by
definition, reflect compromise and thus are more restrictive.
118. See generally Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
248 (1974) (noting that, in 1791, pamphlets and books provided meaningful alternatives to the organized press for the expression of ideas).
119. A newspaper or pamphlet, for instance, might pose the "risk" of influencing public thought. See E. EMERY, THE PRESS AND AMERICA 69-70 (2d ed.
1962). Commercial posters or leaflets, on the other hand, might create
problems concerning litter or efficient use of city streets. See Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 53-55 & n.1 (1942).
120. Such a reality is well-recognized in the economic marketplace, which
is characterized by each major medium's effort to tout its influence with the
public in an effort to attract advertisers.
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dia, rather than on a particular medium, offers a useful perspective from which to begin restoring the free press clause to a
healthier state.
IV. FEAR AND UNLEARNED LESSONS
The history of restricting freedom of expression to ease social discomfort teaches that fear of potential evil is a treacherous basis for control and, in the absence of strict constitutional
standards, a potent chilling force.12 1 The Supreme Court eventually recognized the undesirability and unconstitutionality of
regulating political expression merely on the basis of some remote harm or ill-defined evil.122 Earlier speech controls based
upon generalized fear thus have been "thoroughly discredited."'' m Still, those hard lessons have not instructed sufficiently against like mistakes in the area of content-specific
broadcast regulations. The Court, in sanctioning and effectively
encouraging fear-based media regulation, has not insisted on a
showing of palpable and imminent harm, nor has it insisted on
compelling state interests to justify regulation of programming
that some find offensive.124 It has instead accepted poorly defined assertions of potential evil as bases for regulation.'-5
Parallels with the early cases limiting political speech are
vivid and discomforting.m In each instance, the Court failed to
distinguish between potential and actual danger, thereby relieving the government from the burden of articulating genuine
hazards that might justify control. The consequence in both
settings is a first amendment that affords only limited security
12L See, ag., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 579-81 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting);

id at 585-89

(Douglas, J., dissenting).
Some of the most glaring abuses of first amendment freedom of speech

protections occurred during World War I and in the immediate postwar years,
when generalized but rampant fear of radicalism occasioned suppression or
punishment of expression merely because the words used were potentially

"keys of persuasion ...

[and] triggers of action." Masses Publishing Co. v.

Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 US.

652, 668 (1925) (giving great deference to legislative determination of dangers
of certain utterances advocating overthrow of government).

122. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969) (requiring a
showing of serious and likely harm before speech with unacceptably evil tendencies could be forbidden).

123. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
124. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978); see also spra
notes 63-65 and accompanying text..

125. See Pacia, 438 U.S. at 748-49.
126. See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
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for unpopular expression and subverts a truly uninhibited marketplace of ideas. In both instances, the temptation to cleanse
public dialogue in the interest of protecting the squeamish or
insecure should be resisted.'- 7 Succumbing to the bait of content control would be more in keeping with a system of authoritarian selection than one premised on a multitude of
tongues. 128
If the first amendment is to operate as a constraint on official power and overreaching, 12 9 government standards for acceptable dialogue seem no more permissible for the media than
for the idea marketplace. Government is required to state
clearly a specific, significant danger before it may regulate protected speech. 130 Missing from the judicial scrutiny of fearbased electronic media regulation, however, is any equivalent
insistence that the government identify and establish the existence and compelling nature of the dangers against which it
seeks to protect. Whether the underlying premise is children
in the audience or limited space on the broadcasting spectrum,
rationales proffered for content regulation of broadcasting
should be scrutinized by the courts to determine whether the
substantive evil feared is a likely consequence.13 1 Particularly
when first amendment interests are implicated, "a big difference [exists] between the danger of an abuse and the abuse
u32
itself.'
The first amendment assumes that the public may react
wrongly to information, be antagonized, or even be duped or
127. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-49; id, at 453-57 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
128. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943), qff'd, 326

U.S. 1 (1945).
129. See Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 905, 924 (1984)
("The premise is not that speech is especially good, but that its regulation is
especially dangerous.").
130. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639
(1943) ("grave and immediate danger"); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,
52 (1919) ("clear and present danger").
131. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843-44
(1978) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378-79 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)). Still, two justices have noted that the FCC has been given the
initial responsibility for determining whether speech may be banned from the
airwaves and suggested that "its judgment is entitled to respect." FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 759-60 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
132. Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 128
(7th Cir. 1982); see also Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(speculating that some FCC regulatory policies may not withstand constitutional scrutiny in the light of contemporary first amendment analysis), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
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misled.1-3 Those risks or consequences perhaps may be minimized by the existing preference for identifying peculiar characteristics of a medium, regulating the medium based on those
peculiar characteristics, and subjecting the regulations to lesser
standards of review. Such analytical pursuit, however, represents a radical departure from the first amendment notion of
diverse expression, abuse, and ultimate balance. Unpopular or
offensive expression is an inescapable consequence of free expression, and any power to sanitize public discourse on the basis
of fear is in effect limitless. To the extent fear of potential evil
underlies media control, "a substantial risk of suppressing ideas
in the process" exists. 134 Given the dominance of newer media,
fear-based regulation whittles away traditional first amendment freedom to a shred of its original fabric.
Although the specific forms of the twentieth century media
were not foreseen by the framers, the possibility that one person's expression would be offensive or discomforting to another
was anticipated and accepted as the inevitable consequence of
free speech. Contemporary media regulation reflects a trade-in
of the values underlying the first amendment for security
against the risks the regulation contemplates. Such a commissioned exchange represents a philosophy more consistent with
sufferance of pluralism only within tolerable, middle-of-theroad bounds than one that supports and values pluralism's implications.las The trade is an uneven one and at least as costly
now as it would have been at the Constitution's drafting.
The arrival of each new medium reintroduces the choice
between media regulation and media protection and renews the
question of whether freedom of the press should exist with or
without regard to the form of the press. Much energy is
wasted, and enormous constitutional damage done, by focusing
on differences that are inconsequential and evil that is not
demonstrated. If it is asking too much that candor and compelling interests justify media regulation, it may be that too little
is demanded of the first amendment.
133. The first amendment also contemplates the danger that some expres-

sion may adversely affect society's self-interest. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978).
134. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,26 (1971), cited in FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 764 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135. Cf Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506-13 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) (overturning zoning ordinance that narrowly defined
"family" according to the pattern found in "white suburbia").

